In this episode, the history of U.S. real estate down cycles is mapped from the Great Depression through today to contextualize the current buyer’s market. Existing home sales sit at 3.91 million annually, the lowest volume in 30 years, while median home prices remain above $400,000 and months of inventory hovers near six. For the first time in any recorded cycle, all three demand-crushing variables (high prices, high rates, and constrained inventory) are hitting simultaneously.
Key Takeaways:
- The “Buyer’s Market” Definition Is Misunderstood A true buyer’s market requires more than seven months of home inventory, and the current market sits just under six, meaning we are not technically there yet despite it feeling like one.
- The Early 1980s Is the Closest Historical Analog Mortgage rates hit 18% then and existing home sales took nearly 20 years to recover peak volume, yet today’s price-to-income ratios and lock-in effect make the current cycle arguably worse.
- Assumable Mortgages Were the 1980s Escape Valve, and That Door Is Closed The mechanism that helped buyers absorb high-rate inventory in the 1980s was lobbied out of conventional loans by the banking industry, and FHA/VA alternatives are too slow and bureaucratic to matter.
- Modern Protections May Be Prolonging the Pain The same government backstops (FDIC, FHA, Fannie Mae, 30-year fixed mortgages) that prevent a Great Depression repeat also slow the price correction needed to renormalize the market.
- Real Price Declines Started in Mid-2025 and Should Not Be Ignored Nominal prices are holding while inflation erodes real value, meaning a stealth correction is already underway that does not show up in headline price data.
Tune into the full episode for the complete historical breakdown and what each past cycle actually signals about how much longer this one could run.
(Podcast transcript below)
Welcome to Get Serious. We’re at Serious Land Capital. We have funded over $6 million worth of land deals with industry leading 41 % operating margins. today I had already teased last week that I wanted to go over kind of the history of real estate down cycles within the US because you know,
gone over a like, you know, crazy buyers market right now just, you know, overall really difficult market to operate in. You know, some folks would say, Hey, is this like the worst ever? And you know, worst in any type of recent memory or, you know, experience of most professionals. But I really wanted to understand that further. So again, like most humans, we should be students of history and
Take a look at what’s happened in the past and see if we can start to piece together You know other learnings for this current current period and also, you know put into perspective Where we’re at and what might have helped in other cycles or start to put timelines on things And also just to start to use some more accurate language like how many you know real estate crashes or even just down markets have there, you know appreciably been
you know, especially significant ones, did they have different themes and so forth? and so, yeah, I wanted to put that together because I think a lot of people might have, you know, global financial crisis during the 08, 09 in mind, but anything beyond that, like starts to get, you know, little cagey as far as, details. so to note.
As I go over this, you know, it’s that we have to be cautious about the availability of data going back because just naturally and obviously data quality is just going to continue to increase for the most part, not always, but generally over the course of time, just better, you know, data, you know, collection tools, better technology, et cetera.
that is able to log the statistics that we need to keep in mind for what actually constitutes a real estate cycle and so forth. So inevitably there’s going to be some difficulties with comparing previous cycles just given
historical difficulties of actually accumulating various data. So I want to keep that in mind and we’ll kind of go in reverse order here, you starting where we’re at now and then kind of compare across a lot of these. And a lot of these were like super informative when I went through this. And yeah, I really leveraged Claude Cowork to help me, you know, solidify a lot of the underlying data and, you know, going back and forth to clarify things a bit further here. So.
A lot of this is from government level data or national association realtors and so forth, heavily peer reviewed and statistically accurate sources and documentation here. So I want to note all of that off the bat.
And then this will also help inform next week’s newsletters to where, you know, we can go into this in, you know, the written form as well. So to note here, mean, first off, like everybody talks about this being a buyer’s market right now, which, you know, if, we’re loosely determining, okay, you know, is it easier to sell properties?
on average right now or purchase properties. Pretty much all the data points would favor the buyer in most parts of the country. mean, just even look at the Dispo Cycle, a lot of real estate investors, land investors, like on average, it’s harder to sell right now. You’ll hear that as a…
common refrain. We’ve certainly seen that on our side for most things like just, know, buyer pool has just diminished, longer days on market, etc. And it was an interesting reframe to really look at the data. And I had no idea. And again, know, most real estate data is centered around, you know, residential sales and homes.
like that, that’s going to be the overarching. we have to be cautious about, you know, taking the nuance from that, applying it to land and so forth, but, know, heavy correlation to homes. mean, that’s, that’s what’s driving most of the value within the real estate, market. and I had no idea that there were actual, you know, textbook definitions of what constitutes a buyer’s market or, or not. I’ve never heard anyone even talk about this.
And so what is a true buyer’s market is where there has to be greater than seven months of home inventory on the market. At the moment, we’re not there. It’s trending there. We’re at almost six months. I’m looking at the data that I have there. And that was almost a year ago.
I wouldn’t be surprised if we’re even closer to that at the moment, close to a year later. And we know early 2026 is definitely worse than 2025 by pretty much every metric that we’ve gone over in a lot of detail on other podcasts and written form. yeah, greater than seven months, technically not a buyer’s market. Very interesting to note that. But it’s interesting to see that it’s flipped to where it’s like,
we’re in a buyer’s market, again, buyer’s market as in favoring buyers on the side of the…
you know, negotiation power, perspective nationally. but because it’s so hard for buyers right now, like this is, you know, by most estimates from a data perspective, like the worst market for buyers to purchase anything, primarily because of record high prices in relation to income, elevated mortgage rates, constrained inventory.
and lack of supply. yeah, we’ve never had that combination in past, downturns that were hitting buyers all at once. So because it’s so unfavorable still for buyers to purchase, like that’s what’s leading it to a buyer’s market. So anybody who actually wants to be a buyer has the capacity to do so, has more negotiation leverage, because there are just so few, few buyers in, in general. So
you know, maybe that’s obvious in retrospect when we, you know, apply the actual definitions there, but I think it’s important to actually consider the underlying fundamentals. and, what we mean when we actually say these, say these phrasings. So like what we’ve been in now, you know, really starting in mid 2022 to, recording this early 2026, lowest annual volume in existing home sales.
past 30 years. And, you know, the historical norm, by the way, for units to move is like a little over 5 million, 5.2 million of homes annually to move in the US. As of Jan 2026 year over year, so that 3.91 pretty significant transaction volume is all well below normal for consecutive years now.
really only compares to GFC in the early 1980s. Months of inventory, again, like we mentioned is that five and a half months, almost six as of a year ago, really close to that seven month buyer’s market threshold. And just keep in mind, the months of inventory was only one and a half months in early 2022. So we really skyrocketed up the inventory here compared to that heavy, heavy seller’s market that we were at.
critical here, median home price as of late 2025, over 400 grand. Prices are still stubbornly high, but real prices, inflation adjusted, actually started declining from June 2025 onward, first time in 10 years. So finally starting to catch up where you might start taking some pressure off buyers here. Mortgage rates, as we’re well aware, had
Um, one of the fastest increases ever from, you know, January, uh, 2021 to, um, you know, the 2023, 2024 range, um, don’t seem to be going down anytime soon. Lock in effect. Everybody’s familiar there. You got a lot of people that locked in on sub 3 % mortgages and, the COVID era, uh, and now, you know, the homeowners are less comfortable selling if rates are 6 % plus.
Actually now, if you look at the current data, there’s actually a bit more homeowners with mortgage rates above 6 % compared to those below 3%. So those lines have now crossed, I think as of late 2025. So that lock-in effect, it’s still notable. I want to say there’s still like 20 plus percent of homeowners, existing homeowners with sub 3 % rates.
so, you know, still very notable millions, millions of homes. but. Yeah. It is transitioning, over time. Affordability. the fed or the Atlanta fed has pointed out that the affordability index lowest in over 20 years, again, no surprise in relation incomes, more price reductions across the board days on market is a bit higher.
As of late 2025, compared to historical averages, but not a massive blowout though yet, still anecdotally in a lot of markets to say like this is, you’re definitely gonna be seeing DOM trend up and land you’ll see that oftentimes here too. So critically like with all of this kept in mind is just we’re in this just almost stagnant.
market where, I mean, this started in 2022 and been four straight years of just, you know, buyer’s market activity again, quote unquote, buyer’s market activity, like with no meaningful price correction, like the prices, we know that they need to come down in relation to incomes here. You know, possibly we could get, you know, with the advent of AI and increased productivity, increase incomes even higher to match.
the prices of homes, but generally it’s going to be an easier trigger to get home prices to lower versus just substantially increasing productivity and income across the entire country. So this has never happened before. Where it’s this long of subnormal transaction activity and the prices haven’t come down, which we’ll get to. And there are some actual reasons behind that that I found very fascinating there. So that’s to set the table.
I wanted to spend the most time there. just, know, given that that’s the situation we’re in now, I’ll move through these other ones, you know, point on, you know, some handful of statistics. and again, you can deep dive into this yourself and so forth if you’d like. maybe I can even link the report. So in the show notes, we’ll, we’ll consider that. So going back again.
Most people will think, okay, previous real estate crash, you know, more recent memory, but still almost 20 years ago, 15, 15ish years ago, at the tail end was that global financial crisis, which is largely considered from 07 to 2012. So I mean, pretty significant, like almost a six year process. So we can kind of keep that in mind if we’ve had a four year process at the moment. Actually it’s almost approaching five.
Not quite, because we’re considering mid 2022 through mid 2026 approaching. So yeah, it still be four years at the moment. But yeah, the GFC peak prices mid 2026 bottomed mid 2011. So yeah, mean, roughly five years to consider. like that can give us some type of precedent.
Um, huge price declines though. Like this is, this is what was significantly different compared to where we’re at now. Um, you know, 26 % nationally, uh, price declines, um, for, uh, for homes just wild. Some metros are seeing 50 % plus, uh, just crazy. Um, you know, 20, 27 or, uh, 20, 2007, excuse me, uh, largest single year drop in home sales in 20 years.
26.4 % peak months of inventory, 8.7 months, like true deep buyers market territory. This was in mid 2010. This was the highest ever in modern data series. you know, keeping that in mind, there were tons of foreclosures, millions, 4 million foreclosures, which actually added to the supply here. So
That’s a bit different from today where we’re inherently more supply constrained because people just are trying to sell at too high of prices and not meeting the buyers where they’re at. Whereas the millions of foreclosures that were happening during the GFC were actually adding to the supply, but there weren’t buyers around either in that case.
and can make it even harder to sell because you’re facing all these, you know, super distressed sellers. And that months on inventory, by the way, stayed above seven months for almost like two to three years. So keep in mind, we haven’t hit seven plus months yet in today’s real estate market. Whereas, between 09 and 2012, I mean, it was.
months in inventory, we’re all, you know, above seven months. So like we could still have significantly more pain to play out even though this this situation is materially different than the GFC. But you know, the Fed called it, you know, long, but you know, unusually slow recovery for the GFC. You’d probably say the same thing at the moment here. But truly, like GFC was a worst buyers market by
pretty much every metric, more inventory, crashing prices, desperate sellers. But if you were a buyer with capital, you could acquire the assets at substantial discounts here, which is something we haven’t seen yet. Like they’re starting to become more distressed, but like a lot of folks, especially in land space will also say like, you know, sellers are still behind the times. They want sky high prices.
you know, even a lot of homeowners, you know, they bought peak markets, like they’re, they’re not under pressure as much to sell here. So like, and we’re sitting on a bunch of liquidity too, but it’s still, it’s not like we can just scoop up a bunch of inventory at the moment of just like killer prices because that opportunity has not, presented itself. So right now, like it’s still even harder to be a buyer than it was.
in the GFC, regardless of whether you have cash. Next one up. So this is the early 1980s recession. Probably, you know, some people might have heard of it. You know, but again, you’re we’re going back 45 years now to really start considering it. And most people think, oh, yeah, it’s like this is when interest rates were very high. So that that was kind of the key calling card. And this is probably the most similar situation to what we’re in now. So I
Mortgage rates were at 18%. It triple what they were at now in late 1981. Stayed in that range for almost four years. Just kind of keep that in mind. Significant sales volume collapse, 50 % decline over four years. Again, no one could afford houses with those high mortgage rates.
And, you know, but key to the point, like the GFC had almost, you know, just national decreases in home values. Whereas it was much more regional for the 1980s, which is largely what you could say now, like much of the COVID boom markets, we know the South and the West, Southeast tended to get hit harder. More parts of the country, but the Midwest and Northeast have been more resilient.
Uh, or they might’ve gotten hit harder during the early COVID years. now, you know, it’s more of a rebound there. Um, and critically during this 1980s recession is that, um, it took, uh, almost 20 years, nearly 18 years. So it took until 1996. Um, this is when I was still a young and I had no idea about this stuff for existing home sales to exceed the 1978.
peak. So longest volume recovery in modern data, and that’s keeping in mind too, like the population was growing over those almost 20 years and it still took, you know, nearly two decades for, for home sales to exceed that peak again from the late seventies. just again, this is really important to keep in mind, you know, how much pain we might be in for to, to have to eat.
because all these cycles are a little bit different and none are exactly the same. And so you have to be aware, okay, this might be shorter than we might expect, but usually it’s more prudent to plan for the longterm. Okay. If we’re like really settling in for something here, a lot of pain, like what does that actually look like and what do you have to do to switch up your business? Fascinatingly, the
escape valve for this particular crisis was that there were assumable mortgages that were available at the time. what buyers could do was take a seller’s existing below market mortgage. So like, for example, if we take this modern context, you know,
how we could bring some buyers in is like, you know, somebody who had locked in one of those, you know, sub 3 % mortgages in the early COVID years, if they wanted to sell their house, like a new buyer could come in and just assume that mortgage, that mechanism no longer exists for conventional loans. So like, we don’t have that escape valve in place nowadays anymore.
And critically, was the banking industry’s lobbying efforts that really pushed to remove these assumable mortgages because effectively, it would destroy the lender’s capacity to lend here.
If the lenders are now having to borrow at higher rates, but you’re having buyers come in who are able to take on existing lower rate mortgages, like the banking industry is effectively losing money on those deals. And so they wouldn’t be incentivized to work through them. It would take forever to allow those to happen. Interestingly, you could still
get those assumable mortgages with FHA and VA loans, technically. However, they’re basically never events because it’s just crazy slow and bureaucratic to deal with. Lenders are not incentivized to do this because they’re going to lose money on it. And you try to work through the government for some of these loans, it’s naturally going to take forever to do it.
And, you know, people were even trying to do this, even with the FHA and VA loans from the COVID era, like exactly trying to assume these sub 3 % rates. But the servicers were taking like half a year to get these done. just like, it just fell apart. like, that’s just an unreliable mechanism to rely on. like, if you destroy the lending industry along the way, like it just creates another crisis there.
It helped us get out of that one, it’s a tool that doesn’t, it’s way too much of a double edged sword to be reliable going forward here. So, writ large here, that early 1980s.
crisis was the closest historical analog to our current cycle here, where it’s just high rates are really hitting, crushing demand while the prices stay elevated. And I’d say for this current situation, it’s much more even the prices even versus the mortgage rates like that.
seems to be where the data points out. Nevertheless, like fairly similar parallel. know, but again, like kind of the argument here though, too, is that what could make this situation even worse than the early 1980s is again, we don’t have a similar mortgages to escape again, that was going to be a double edged sword, but it did help it in, you know, almost 50 years ago.
The home price to income ratios are actually much more stretched now. So it was more affordable to get a home in the early 1980s anyway. Nor was there like a significant lock in effect during the 1980s either still like the relatively higher interest rates comparatively from
you know, existing homeowners. So, cause again, like it, spiked faster during this, this current, situation, over a shorter period of time. so something to note, now we get in into some other ones. there was this, savings loan.
crisis in the early 1990s. I know this jumping a little bit forward in time, like it’s a little less relevant because it was just much shorter, know, sub one year, barely any price declines. And it was, super regional, like heavy Northeast and parts of California were the heaviest involvement. And it was more of a lender.
the crisis, you know, and folks being able to get credit rather than, rather than, demand. however, there was an eight year, real price, decline for, you know, a long period, you know, again, eight years, pretty, pretty significant, decline here, to where you had, you know, over the course of again, eight years.
Um, you know, minus 14%, yeah. Significant, but not, you know, incredibly major, uh, from mid 1989 all the way into, uh, 1997. So key to keep in mind as far as like that real price decline, even though like the true recession or the crisis that happened only lasted for less than a year. So it’s like just important to remember as well that.
some of these, like if a lot of pain gets eaten in a short period of time, like it might take a lot longer to, to actually parse through the system, just given how large these entities and, know, the millions and billions of trillions of dollars that are involved in, this particular industry. keeping that in note, next here, this is like, this is the last major one.
to go over Great Depression. Everybody’s heard of it, right? And this is really the last housing cycle that, you the data was not as good as it is now, but it’s like the first kind of modern data point where there’s enough to point to and have some reliability without just being like, I’m not really sure what I’m looking at. Absolutely crazy what was happening in the, like everybody, yeah, the Great Depression. I mean, we haven’t seen anything like it. When you actually look at these numbers,
And most people are considering across the whole economy, but when you center to ran from the real estate perspective, like it’s it’s wild. Uh, I can’t imagine what those folks were going through at the time. Um, home price decline 67 % from, uh, mid 1929 to the end of 1932. Um, there was an alternative measure that was closer to like a 26 % decline, you know, around the same period of time, slightly longer. So.
have to keep that in mind either way, huge declines. There was over 1000 foreclosures per day, per day by 1933. And keep in mind, like all of GFC, was roughly 4 million foreclosures and there was way less people. The population was much smaller comparatively, almost a hundred years prior to the GFC. So I’m just doing the math.
Thousand foreclosures. Yeah, I this should be pretty pretty basic, Chris. So three hundred sixty five thousand foreclosures per year. OK, basic math there. Almost half of all U.S. home mortgages were in default, like just absurd. Ninety five percent decline in residential construction during the.
you know, core part of the crisis. Um, housing starts fell to 10 % of the 1929 levels, um, were single year for prices. So it wasn’t like, you know, some of them in like the GFC, there was like, you know, 25 ish percent decline in one year. Worse single year for prices was a minus 10 and a half percent in 1932. Um, still really bad, just bad over a longer period of time. Um, and you know,
Price collapse was mainly 1929 to 1933, but the market remained depressed throughout the entire 1930s. Like we’re well aware of that and full price recovery took until really after World War II into the 1940s, 1950s. It was a long, long crisis. And…
So like, it’s very clear looking at this, like we’re nowhere near those. mean, half of all mortgages in default, like nothing even close to what happened during the great depression. Like objectively worse. However, like it was a materially different economy, way different, you know, structural protections are now in place.
to prevent a lot of those worst case scenarios, that happened during the great depression. and they’re actually could be preventing some of the pain from passing quicker. nowadays. So like that, that’s kind of fascinating to note is that,
You know, mortgages during and, uh, you know, prior to the depression were only like five to 10 year terms. Um, interest only, uh, giant balloon payment at the end, like totally unlike today’s modern mortgages. Um, and, uh, you know, generally the expectation was that you just refinance into a new loan when the balloon came, um, fine during stable credit markets.
Um, but when, credit kind of exploded during the, uh, the, crisis, you know, the banks just started failing. couldn’t issue new loans, no refinancing, um, mass default, more bank failures, just spiraling like crazy. Um, but the down payments were also like 50 % or more, like pretty crazy. Um, the home ownership rate, was Trent, you know, still trended towards more of the wealthy.
individuals, even though it’s like such an income disparity nowadays, it was still even more so back then, you know, like 44 % of home ownership rate across the US in 1940. So it could have been even the last 10 years prior, whereas now we’re at like 66%. So substantially different there. So there was a whole bunch of things that came in again, these are like worth podcasts in and of themselves, but there was the
federal home loan bank system that came into play during the crisis. So that was a wholesale funding backstop for lenders. Like, you know, basically bails lenders out. This was heavily utilized during the GFC, by the way. There was a homeowners loan corporation that that started. So this was another government entity that could just purchase defaulted mortgages from lenders and then restructure them into
self-amortizing loans for the borrowers. So this actually formed the fixed rate long-term, you know, 30, 35 year mortgage that exists nowadays, like all came from this crisis. The FHA was also started and that would ensure that there would be
government insurance for mortgages. So that allowed, well, that was kind of like combined with the previous option where now lenders could offer lower down payments to borrowers and have longer terms because the government would backstop the loss. Fannie Mae came onto the market. So that would be a secondary market for mortgages, meaning banks could originate loans.
sell it, know, it’s basically like selling a note, you know, from the land investment side. So then you can just recapitalize and basically lend on more products. So that got increased capital back to lenders there. And there was also the FDIC was created during this Great Depression era, giving deposit
insurance, so like basically trying to prevent bank runs from from happening. And, you know, interestingly, like the banking situation in oh, wait, was worse than the Great Depression. But because we had these protections in place, we didn’t see the bank runs happening because they’re you know, this federal law.
deposit, deposit insurance. And like I mentioned, you know, the 30 year fixed rate mortgage. It was spurred on by some of those earlier items I mentioned, but it was only viable because of that secondary market, which was, know, from the Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginny, and the implicit government guarantee behind it. Like it was all those forces put together because like no private market, you know, would produce a 30 year fixed rate loan.
like it just it didn’t make sense from our obvious perspective. It’s because the government will will ensure those those options. But interestingly, like even though they all made sense as far as protecting
U.S. citizens and, you know, ultimately banks and the entire government as a whole here too, from preventing something like the Great Depression happening again. Like we could see that even though the pain took a long time to process through, but really the core, core depression is like roughly four years or so, just like these catastrophic price decreases and huge defaults. Like it allowed all that pain to filter through the system faster. Whereas we have
all of those protections in place now, that can actually be prolonging the pain for longer than we would typically have seen had those not been in place. Like could we’ve been in a great depression type of setup now again, or could it have happened again like during the GFC and so forth too, probably if we didn’t have those protections in place. so now, again, we have to kind of look at what’s a feature, what’s a bug. Well, it’s kind of both.
Double-edged swords again here too, where we have all these mechanisms really preventing buyers from coming back into the market or letting prices fall as much as they need to to renormalize the housing market that we might be stuck in this frozen pattern for longer than we might have anticipated. So worth considering that as well.
And really as we wrap up here, I mean, there were a handful of other, you know, recessions related to real estate. There’s some in the 1870s. That seems to be, you know, there was a 65 month depression called a long depression. I’d never heard of this before. 65, so that’s like over five years. So the longest contraction ever.
Um, even longer than the great depression, which is 43 months. So what is that? Um, uh, so three and a half years roughly. Um, and yeah, tons of business failures. This was like during the railroads, which again, kind of keep in mind, a of people will talk about, you know, the railroad issue and in comparison to what’s going on with AI and the infrastructure build out. Um, so, you know, keep that in mind for, uh, uh, what could, you know,
effectively happened, like, again, the data is so incomplete from back then that it’s difficult to parse out what could have been related to housing. was another panic of 1893, major market crash, housing specific data, very limited.
Uh, so that, that, that, that’s kind of all we have, um, in terms of, you know, going back across, you know, us history. So you can imagine there might’ve been some other stuff in the 1800s and so forth to compare it to. Um, uh, but you know, the, data was, was just not, um, not there, but, know, again, like when we’re considering what’s truly the worst market here.
each of these like have some of their their arguments in place. But like basically in all these downturns we talked about, like there was at least one of those three variables, you know, the prices were too high, rates were too high, inventory was constrained to allow buyers to to purchase. But most of the time, it was only dealing with like one or maybe two of these like during the depression prices just
collapsed, right? Like no one could afford anything. Just all those foreclosures. During the GFC, prices collapsed and rates were low during some of those government emergency measures. During the early 80s, prices softened, but assumable mortgages existed. Again, kind of an escape valve. However, today, like
All three of those variables are hostile simultaneously. again, high prices, high rates, and lack of inventory to go after. So that’s why we can take lessons from the past, but we’re truly in unprecedented, territory, in relation to a real estate cycle. So, like it is definitely nasty out there.
comparatively as nasty, it’s like, again, kind of pick your poison, so to speak here. And this could go on a lot longer than any of us might expect. That’s what you have to plan for, but hopefully sooner. Really hard to piece that all out. So with all of that,
in mind. And I’m just looking at this last data point. Or is just saying, don’t sleep on the real price decline starting in 2025. Yeah, we mentioned that the nominal price is holding steady while inflation erodes. Real value is how markets often correct without a crash. Very interesting.
Okay. Yeah. I hadn’t considered that too. So yeah, if inflation continues to rise here, but prices just remain steady here, that could lead to a correction because all of a sudden, assuming incomes follow, where inflation is heading again, if inflation is too high, it’s not going to matter. you could get actual price correction. if
home prices are not keeping up with inflation as well. So that could be a route out of this potentially, but you’d still need a lot to go right for that to happen. So all that in mind, hope you enjoyed this deep dive into the history. know this is a bit longer, but anybody’s in the real estate space, like we should all understand the precedents that we’re working with and pull out as many lessons as we possibly can. Notably as well to,
Um, Callan, uh, and the uncommon business team, um, this is, uh, early bird pricing for their bootcamp. Again, I am all in on AI, regardless of student gloom and so forth, like never still never been more excited to be alive and being a business owner because the tools at our fingertips, I’ve learned almost everything from the AI perspective from Callan and her team. So $47, um, uh, until early April to, uh, to join the bootcamp.
Again, the tools have never been better. Claude, cowork, et cetera. You’ve heard me talk about this. link to sign up is in the show notes below. Hope to see you there. Subscribe and share everybody. Talk to you all next time.
